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 I. INTRODUCTION 
Background  
Minimum wage provisions were first introduced by the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) 
of 1938.  Since its passage, advocates have “argued that minimum wage laws enhance 
social welfare by guaranteeing that all workers receive a ‘fair’ wage for their labor,”  
while opponents maintain that a minimum wage “only guarantees excessively low 
employment among the relatively unskilled.”1  Economists have generated a large body 
of literature analyzing these arguments, but have not yet found definitive answers.     
 In November of 1996 Oregon voters passed a three-step increase in the state 
minimum wage.  On January 1, 1997 the minimum wage was increased from $4.75 to 
$5.50, and was subsequently increased on January 1, 1998 and 1999 to $6.00 and $6.50 
respectively.  Singell and Terborg (2001) note that the Oregon case offers a particularly 
good area of study, as “the minimum wage increase is relatively large in magnitude (a 37 
percent increase) and over a longer duration…than prior studies of the minimum wage.”   
  This study will evaluate, through empirical analysis, the employment effects of 
the 1997-99 minimum wage increases in Oregon.  The effects will be estimated by 
exploiting geographical wage variation at the county and metropolitan statistical area 
(MSA) levels.  This paper will test the prediction of the standard economic model: 
increases in the minimum wage will have greater adverse effects on employment in areas 
in which there is a relatively large percentage of industries that pay “low wages” (as these 
are the areas in which the minimum wage will have the largest effect on wages).  
                                                 
1 Linneman, P. (1982). ‘The economic impacts of minimum wage laws: a new look at an old question’ 
Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 90, p. 444. 
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Ultimately, this study does not find any evidence in support of the hypothesis.  The 
welfare effects of the minimum wage increases will not be addressed in this paper.  
 The remainder of this section is devoted to economic theory on minimum wage 
legislation (for those unfamiliar) and prior research done on the employment effects of 
minimum wage legislation.  The methodology and equations estimated in this study are 
discussed in section II.  Section III presents the estimates of the equations and discusses 
the implications of the results.  In section IV I offer my opinion on the validity of 
economic theory given the results of this study.  Section V contains a summary.    
Theory 
Standard Economic Model 
The standard economic model (Figure 1.1) predicts that minimum wages cause 
unemployment.  
Figure 1.1
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This model assumes: (1) a competitive labor market, (2) complete coverage (all workers 
are affected by the law), and (3) homogenous labor (workers are similar in all wage-
determining respects).  The labor supply curve (S) gives the amount of workers who are 
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willing to work at any given wage level (W) and the labor demand curve (D) gives the 
total number of workers that firms in the market demand at any given wage level. We 
begin with a market in equilibrium (labor supply (S) = labor demand (D)).  The 
equilibrium wage is W0 and the equilibrium level of employment is E0.  W0 will be the 
prevailing wage because at any other wage level there will be either upward or downward 
pressures on the wage: a wage lower than W0 will lead to more jobs than there are 
workers willing to work, and a wage above W0 will lead to more workers willing to work 
than there are jobs.  Thus, there is no unemployment in a competitive labor market that is 
in long-run equilibrium.  At the market equilibrium wage (W0) the number of persons 
who want to work is equal to the number of workers firms want to hire. 
 Now suppose that the government imposes a minimum wage (W1) that is binding 
(W1>W0)2.  Firms will move up the labor demand curve to W1 (because they cannot pay 
less) and employment falls to E1 (firms demand less workers as the price of labor 
increases).  Some workers (E1-E0) have lost their jobs and are unemployed.  Additionally, 
because of the increased wage, more persons are now willing to work (E2-E0) but cannot 
find jobs.  In total, the minimum wage has created unemployment of E2-E1.  Therefore, a 
minimum wage creates unemployment both because previously employed workers lose 
their jobs and because the higher wage has attracted additional workers into the labor 
market who also cannot find work. 
Monopsony Model 
There is, however, a situation in which a skillfully set minimum wage may raise 
employment. This situation can occur in a monopsonistic labor market (Figure 1.2), in 
                                                 
2 A nonbinding minimum wage (W1<W0) does not require firms to raise workers’ wages; thus, nonbinding 
minimum wages have no effect on employment.    
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which there is a single buyer of labor (the “competitive labor market” assumption above 
is relaxed).   
Figure 1.2
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In this model the sole employer can choose what wage to pay; the higher the wage that 
the employer offers, the higher the supply of workers.  The profit-maximizing firm will 
choose the level of employment where the value of the product produced by the last 
worker hired3 is equal to the cost of that worker (marginal revenue product of labor 
(MRPL) = marginal cost of labor (MCL)).  Note that the cost of the last worker hired is 
greater than the wage, as raising the wage to attract the last worker also requires the firm 
to raise the wages of all the previously hired workers.  The result of this feature is that 
each worker is paid less than the value that they create.  It is because of this gap that the 
minimum wage can raise the wage of workers without forcing them into unemployment. 
 We can see this possibility in Figure 1.2.  Before the imposition of a minimum 
wage, the monopsony firm hires workers until the marginal cost of labor (MCL) is equal 
to the marginal revenue product of labor (MRPL).  The equilibrium level of employment 
                                                 
3 The value of the product produced by the last worker hired is less than that of the previous worker hired, 
as additional workers are less productive when they are added to a fixed amount of capital (the law of 
diminishing returns).  Hence, the slope of the marginal revenue product of labor (MRPL) schedule is 
negative. 
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(E0) and labor supply (S) determine the equilibrium wage (W0).  Now suppose that a 
binding minimum wage (W1) is introduced.  The marginal cost of labor collapses to the 
minimum wage (because the firm cannot pay less) until it intersects the labor supply 
curve (after which the firm will need to pay above the minimum wage in order to attract 
more workers).  Now that the firm does not have the option of paying workers less than 
the minimum wage, it might as well hire as many workers as it can get at the minimum 
wage level (E1).  Thus, employment increases by E1-E0.   
 It is important to note that the highest level to which the minimum wage can be 
raised without decreasing employment again is the wage level that would have prevailed 
under a competitive labor market (at the intersection of (S) and (MRPL)).  Therefore, the 
level to which the minimum wage can be increased before employment starts to fall 
depends on the elasticity (slope)4 of both the labor supply schedule (S) and labor demand 
schedule (MRPL).  Notice that if the slope of labor supply (S) was close to flat, the 
window in which a minimum wage increase could cause positive employment effects is 
extremely small (flattening MRPL widens the window).  This attribute greatly reduces 
the monopsony model’s validity: the general consensus is that “the typical minimum-
wage employer is not a mining company in an isolated company town but a retail trade or 
service employer in a labor market with many such employers,” and so one would expect 
that “the elasticity of labor supply to any one such employer should…be ‘close’ to 
                                                 
4 Elasticity is the percentage change in the dependent variable caused by a 1 percent increase in the 
independent variable, or (∆W/ ∆E), or the slope of the line.  Economists typically use elasticity to describe 
how sensitive the demand/supply for a particular good is to changes in the price.  If demand/supply varies 
greatly with price, then demand/supply for the good is said to be elastic.  If not, then demand/supply for the 
good is said to be inelastic.       
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infinite [very flat].”5  Thus, many economists feel that, in reality, the opening for a 
skillfully set minimum wage is negligible.6
 However, Dolado et al. (1995) argue that “the important features of monopsony 
will be reproduced in any situation where firms have some discretion over the wages they 
pay.”  Intuition and common experience tell us that this case is quite common, as the 
average firm will find it easier to recruit and retain workers if it offers a higher wage.  
The perfect competition model says that firms have no control over the wages that they 
pay, and so the implication is that if an employer cuts wages by even a fraction of a 
penny, all of its workers will immediately leave.  This assumption is just as extreme as 
those of the pure monopsony model, and so “the important question is the extent of 
monopsony power.”7  If this is the case then economic theory does not make an 
unambiguous prediction on the employment effects of the minimum wage.  We can then 
only hope to answer the question through empirical research.8   
Other Models 
Recall that the monopsony model relaxes the “competitive labor market” assumption of 
the standard economic model.  Additional models are needed when the other two basic 
assumptions of the standard model are relaxed.  For a detailed discussion of these models 
[as well as alternative versions of the monopsony model and a discussion of cases in 
which employers cut job package costs (fringe benefits, training, etc.) instead of 
employees] see Brown (1999), pp. 2003-2111.   
                                                 
5 Brown C. (1999). ‘Minimum wages, employment and the distribution of income’, in Ashenfelter, O. and 
Card, D. (eds), Handbook of Labor Economics, Vol. 3, Elsevier, Amsterdam, 2108. 
6 Ibid., 2108-9.   
7 Dolado, J., Kramarz, F., Machin, S., and Manning, A., Margolis, D. and Teulings, C. (1995). ‘The 
economic impact of minimum wages in Europe’, Economic Policy, Vol. 23, p. 330. 
8 Ibid., 330. 
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Methodology 
Generally, economists use two different approaches in order to analyze empirical 
evidence on the effects of a minimum wage.  The first method is to look at the correlation 
between employment changes and minimum wage changes, while controlling for other 
relevant factors.  This approach takes advantage of variation in minimum wages over 
time and/or across industries and regions.9
 The second method is to examine instances in which minimum wages are raised 
and treat them as a “natural experiment”.  This approach compares a group that is directly 
affected by new minimum wage legislation to an unaffected (or varyingly affected) 
“control” group.  The control group might be a nearby state or region, or a high-wage 
group (which is not addressed by minimum wage legislation).  High-wage groups are 
typically identified by region, firm, individual, industry, occupation, or demographic (age, 
education, etc.).10  
Empirical Research  
Research Done Prior to 1982 
Early research primarily gathered time-series data on the variation in minimum wages 
and employment.  Time-series analysis examines variables over time.  The standard 
statistical model for the time-series literature is 
Et = α*Xt + β*MWt + εt
where Et is the employment/population ratio, Xt controls for relevant variables such as 
time trends (business cycles), MWt is the level of the minimum wage, usually relative to 
the average wage, εt  is the error term, and the subscript t denotes the time at which each 
                                                 
9 Ibid., 330-31. 
10 Ibid., 331. 
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data point was taken.11  Resultantly, β is the estimate of the relationship between 
minimum wage levels and employment over time.   
 Most of these studies focused on teenagers because teenagers are generally 
considered a “low-wage” group.  This characteristic means that the proportion of 
teenagers directly affected by the minimum wage is larger than that of the whole 
population, and so the anticipated effect on teenage employment is likely to be larger.12  
Brown et al. (1982) noted that the studies available at that time, taken as a whole, 
revealed a teenage employment elasticity (β) between -0.1 and -0.3.  This means that a 
10% increase in the minimum wage typically resulted in a reduction in teenage 
employment of 1 to 3%.  These results were generally statistically significant.13
Recent Research 
More recent research relies more on the aforementioned “natural experiment” approach 
than the time-series approach, and has provided mixed evidence on the employment 
effects of minimum wage legislation.  Perhaps the most famous and controversial study 
using this methodology is by Card and Krueger (1994).  Card and Krueger use New 
Jersey’s 1992 minimum wage increase in order to conduct two employment outcome 
comparisons: (1) fast-food industry employment growth in New Jersey versus that of 
nearby Pennsylvania (the control), and (2) within New Jersey, the employment changes at 
fast-food restaurants initially paying high wages (the control) versus those initially 
paying low wages.  In both cases Card and Krueger find evidence that the increase in the 
                                                 
11 Brown C. (1999). ‘Minimum wages, employment and the distribution of income’, in Ashenfelter, O. and 
Card, D. (eds), Handbook of Labor Economics, Vol. 3, Elsevier, Amsterdam, 2113-4. 
12 Ibid., 2107. 
13 Ibid., 2115. 
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minimum wage increased employment.  This finding directly contradicts the predictions 
of the standard economic model.   
 Though the Card and Krueger (1992) study has not gone unchallenged (Neumark 
and Wascher, 2000) or unrevised (Card and Krueger, 2000), it continues to be an 
important part of a growing body of literature that has cast significant doubt on traditional 
theory.  The findings of this body of literature are largely in keeping with Card and 
Kruger (2000), who argue that  
 because of friction in the labor market, a minimum wage increase can be expected to 
cause some firms to reduce employment and others to raise employment, with these two 
effects potentially canceling out if the rise in the minimum wage is modest. 
 
Dolado et al. (1995) review 30 years of minimum wage legislation in Europe and offer 
this conclusion:  
 The importance of minimum wages has probably been exaggerated…. The evidence on 
the employment effects of minimum wage legislation is very mixed. We have found 
evidence that higher minimum wages reduced employment in some cases…and raised it 
in others…. We should emphasize that none of our results suggests that the effects (good 
or bad) on the economy of current levels of minimum wages are particularly large. 
 
For additional studies that find similar results see Card (1992), Katz and Krueger (1992), 
and Stewart (2003) and (2004).   
 This is not to suggest, however, that the new consensus is that minimum wages 
have no effect on employment.  Burkhauser et al. (2000) estimate that the elasticity of 
teenage employment is between -.2 and -.6 and argue that the macroeconomic controls 
used in studies such as Card and Krueger (1995) eliminate all variation in the minimum 
wage variable, which thereby reduces “the likelihood of obtaining a precise estimate of 
the impact of the [minimum wage] policy being examined.”  Deere et al. (1995) compare 
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the changes in employment rates of high- and low-wage workers and find that after the 
1990-91 U.S. national minimum wage increases, subgroups with more low-wage workers 
experienced larger declines in employment.  In particular, they find that teenagers bore a 
significant portion of the job losses.  In Oregon, Singell and Terborg (2001) conduct three 
natural experiment analyses on the employment effects of the 1997-99 minimum wage 
increases, in the restaurant industry, and find data that are consistent with neoclassical 
economic theory.  Other studies that find the more standard effect include Neumark and 
Wascher (1992) and (2000), and Neumark (2001).  
 Taken as a whole, the findings of research on the employment effects of the 
minimum wage are inconclusive.  It is probable that the minimum wage question will 
remain a contentious one for sometime to come.   
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II. METHODOLOGY 
This study is in keeping with “natural experiment” studies that compare changes in 
employment measures between groups with high and low percentages of low-wage 
workers.  One of the first such studies was conducted by Linneman (1982), who 
compares individuals above and below the national minimum wage established by the 
1974 FLSA amendment (prior to its enactment) in order to parameterize the 
disemployment effects of the amendment on the subminimum population.  Rather than 
comparing individuals, Card and Krueger (1994) compare high- and low-wage 
companies, and several other studies alternatively compare high- and low-wage 
geographical areas (Card, 1992; Deere et al., 1995).   
 The method of this study also involves exploiting geographical wage variation, 
and most closely follows the model set by Stewart (2003).  Stewart begins by dividing the 
UK into 140 “local areas”.  In each area Stewart relates the change in the employment 
rate, in a period straddling the minimum wage introduction in 1999, with the proportion 
of individuals who are “low paid” (earning less than the minimum wage prior to the 
minimum wage introduction).  Any minimum wage will take a larger “bite” into an area’s 
wage distribution if a greater proportion of its population is initially earning a wage that 
is lower than the new minimum, and so one would expect that in such areas the 
employment effects will be more negative (if the standard economic model is to be 
supported).        
 This study analyzes geographical wage variation in Oregon at the county and 
metropolitan statistical area (MSA) levels.  County level data are used when available, 
and Benton, Lane, and Jackson counties have been substituted with Corvallis MSA, 
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Eugene-Springfield MSA, and Medford-Ashland MSA, respectively.  Due to a lack of 
available data, Gilliam and Wheeler counties are not included in the analysis.  Only two 
industries were surveyed in Gilliam County (with a total annual average weekly 
employment of five persons in 1996) and only three industries were surveyed in Wheeler 
(with a total annual average weekly employment of two persons in 1996).  In total, 34 
geographical areas are examined.   
 The impact of the of the three-step increase in the Oregon minimum wage on 
employment is estimated by two very similar statistical models.  The first model takes the 
form: 
∆Eg,s-e = α0 + βPg,s + εg,s   (1) 
where ∆Eg,s-e  is the change in the employment rate between time interval s-e in area g, 
Pg,s is the proportion of industries in area g who are “low paid” at time s, and εg,s is the 
error term.  The proportion “low paid” in a given area is determined by the percentage of 
3-digit NAICS14 industries, within that area, which pay an average weekly wage that is at 
least one standard deviation below the average weekly wage paid by all 3-digit NAICS 
industries in the state of Oregon.  In the fourth quarter of 1996, the state average weekly 
wage for all 3-digit NAICS industries was $496.82 with a standard deviation of $240.95, 
which defined “low pay” industries as those paying an average weekly wage of less than 
$255.87 ($496.82 - $240.95).  This definition is markedly different from that of Stewart 
(2003), who uses individual level data rather than industry level data, and is able to 
define the proportion “low paid” as the proportion of individuals within a given area who 
earn less than the minimum wage prior to the minimum wage introduction.  Ideally, this 
                                                 
14 North American Industry Classification System – for example, NAICS 445 identifies “Food and 
Beverage Stores”.  
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study would also employ Stewart’s definition, which addresses the minimum wage 
question more directly, but individual level data in Oregon is not readily available. 
Consequently, the alternative method of identifying “low pay” areas has been used.   
 Equation (1) is estimated using data over four different time intervals.  The first 
dataset specifies s as the fourth quarter of 1996 and e as the fourth quarter of 2000.  
Recall that the three minimum wage increases occurred between January 1, 1997 and 
January 1, 1999.  Thus, this specification allows the proportion “low paid” in the quarter 
immediately preceding the first minimum wage increase (Q4 96) to predict the change in 
the employment rate in a given area across an interval that spans all three minimum wage 
increases [Q4 96 - Q4 00].  The next two regressions use the intervals [Q4 96 - Q4 01] 
and [Q4 96 - Q4 02].  Note that these time intervals allow for the possibility that the 
impact of a minimum wage introduction will occur with a lag (see Burkhauser et al., 
2000; Neumark, 2001).  The fourth regression is a control regression, which estimates the 
equation over the interval [Q4 92 - Q4 96], where the proportion “low paid” in Q4 9215 is 
the predictor.  The minimum wage was not increased during this time interval, which is 
why it has been identified as a suitable control.        
 The second model takes the form: 
∆Tg,s-e = α0 + βPg,s + εg,s   (2) 
where all of the variables are identical to those of equation (1), except the independent 
variable is now ∆Tg,s-e, which represents the change in total employment between time  
                                                 
15 The Q4 92 state average weekly wage for all 3-digit NAICS industries was $445.77 with a standard 
deviation of $214.47, which defined “low pay” industries as those paying an average weekly wage of less 
than $231.30. 
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interval s-e in area g.  The four time intervals used in equation (1) are also used in 
equation (2).   
 Equations (1) and (2) will both test the hypothesis that β  < 0.  This simply means 
that one would expect (given the standard economic theory) that the greater the 
percentage of “low wage” industries within a particular area, the greater the negative 
employment effects will be as a result of the introduction of the minimum wage. 
 The data on wages are from the 1992, 1996, and 2000-02 Quarterly Census of 
Employment and Wages (QCEW).  The employment rate and total employment data are 
from the Oregon Employment Department (OED).  The only data that required any 
transformations were the fourth quarter estimates of employment rates and total 
employment.  These data were only available in monthly figures, and so quarterly figures 
were created by taking the average of the October, November, and December figures.   
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III. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
TABLE 1 
Estimates of the minimum wage impact on employment rates 
Time Interval (s-e) Proportion “low paid” at 
time s: slope coefficient 
(absolute t-ratio) 
Constant (absolute 
t-ratio) 
R2
Q4 96 - Q4 00 5.560 (1.744)* .840 (1.302) .087 
Q4 96 - Q4 01 8.452 (1.883)* -1.876 (2.066) .100 
Q4 96 - Q4 02 16.295 (3.822)* -2.723 (3.158) .313 
Control: Q4 92 - Q4 96 3.000 (.649) .109 (.126) .013 
*Denotes statistical significance at the 10% level.   
 
The estimates based on the employment rate data are presented in Table 1.  Taken as a 
whole, the results conflict with the predictions of the standard economic model.  The 
slope coefficient (β) over the [Q4 96 - Q4 00] interval is 5.560, meaning that a 10% (0.10) 
increase in the proportion “low paid” in a particular area corresponds with a .556% 
(5.560*0.10) increase in that area’s employment rate from 1996 to 2000.  The absolute t-
ratio16 of 1.744 indicates that we can be approximately 95% confident that we can reject 
the hypothesis β  = 0 (which means that β is positive and different from zero).  Recall 
that economic theory predicts β < 0.  As the time interval is expanded to [Q4 96 - Q4 01] 
and [Q4 96 - Q4 02] the estimate of β  becomes more positive and statistically more 
significant.   
 
                                                 
16 The t-ratio is a measure of how statistically significant the estimate is, which is typically defined as how 
confident we can be that the estimate is not random, given that we expect no relationship between the two 
variables (β = 0).  The higher the t-ratio, the more confident we can be that the real value of β  is not zero.   
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TABLE 2 
Estimates of the minimum wage impact on total employment 
Time Interval (s-e) Proportion “low paid” at 
time s: slope coefficient 
(absolute t-ratio) 
Constant (absolute 
t-ratio) 
R2
Q4 96 - Q4 00 -53632.038 (4.060)* 13270.007 (4.967) .340 
Q4 96 - Q4 01 -28483.141 (2.469)* 7086.824 (3.038) .160 
Q4 96 - Q4 02 -34251.040 (2.645)* 8972.864 (3.426) .179 
Control: Q4 92 - Q4 96 -65271.250 (3.806)* 16493.350 (5.133) .312 
*Denotes statistical significance at the 10% level. 
 
 The estimate of β  over the control interval [Q4 92 – Q4 96] is 3.000 with a t-ratio 
of 0.649.  This estimate is not statistically significant, which is expected given that it was 
taken over the interval in which there were no changes in the minimum wage.  The 
general trends over the four time intervals are visible in the area-level scatter plots of the 
change in the employment rate and the proportion in the area that were “low paid” (see 
Appendix: Figures 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4).  The first three graphs show a stronger and 
stronger positive relationship between the proportion “low paid” and the change in the 
employment rate.  The fourth graph, which illustrates the control, shows that there is no 
relationship between the two variables.       
 The estimates based on the total employment data, presented in Table 2, are 
consistent with standard economic theory, but the estimates taken over the affected 
intervals are not significantly different from the estimate taken over the control interval.  
The estimate of β over the interval [Q4 96 - Q4 00] is -53632.038 with a t-ratio of 4.060, 
which is both negative and significant.  However, the estimate of β  over the control 
interval [Q4 92 – Q4 96] is -65271.250 with a t-ratio of 3.806, which is similarly negative 
and similarly significant.  This indicates that the declines in total employment in 
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relatively “low wage” areas were independent of minimum wage legislation.  This trend 
is clearly visible in the area-level scatter plots (see Appendix: Figures 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4).  
The first three graphs, the “affected intervals”, and the last graph, the control interval, all 
show an inverse relationship between the proportion “low paid” and the change in total 
employment.  
 What do the estimates of equations (1) and (2) tell us collectively?  We can be 
fairly certain that total employment increased more in relatively “high wage” areas 
between 1996 and 2002.  We can also be fairly certain that changes in employment rates 
between 1996 and 2002 were more favorable in relatively “low wage” areas.  Several 
possible scenarios can be inferred from these results.   
 First, we know from the control that total employment in “high wage” areas was 
growing before the minimum wage increases, and continued to grow after the minimum 
wage increases.  That “high wage” areas were able to attract more workers makes 
intuitive sense.  So why did employment rates generally decrease in these areas?  One 
possibility is that there was relatively more in-migration into “high wage” areas than into 
“low wage” areas, and that the rate of employment for those that migrated to “high wage” 
areas was lower than the rate of employment in the area (in Q4 1996) to which they 
migrated.  This combination would both lower the rate of employment and increase total 
employment in a particular “high wage” area.  That there was relatively more in-
migration into “high-wage” areas can be seen in the data (see Appendix: Table A1).  The 
three counties with the lowest proportion “low paid” - Multnomah, Washington, and 
Clackamas counties - grew by 21,805, 50,153, and 17,200 people respectively between 
1996 and 2000.  On the other hand, the four counties with the highest proportion “low 
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TABLE 3 
Industry Analysis 
County NAICS Industry 96-00 %∆ Average 
Weekly Employment 
00-02 %∆ Average 
Weekly Employment 
Clackamas 5112 53% -18% 
Multnomah 5112 66% -10% 
Washington 5112 61% -30% 
Clackamas 518 -9% 28% 
Multnomah 518 27% -16% 
Washington 518 33% -16% 
    
    
paid” - Crook, Curry, Harney and Union counties - grew by 2,112, 94, 411, and -382 
people respectively between 1996 and 2000. 
 A possible role that the minimum wage increases could have played in this 
scenario is the following: many of those that migrated to “high wage” areas came from 
“low wage” areas in Oregon, and those “low wage” migrants were forced out of their jobs 
because of the minimum wage.  This is, of course, highly speculative. 
 The results of the regressions also indicate that, relative to 2000, employment 
rates worsened substantially in “high wage” areas in 2001 and 2002.  It is very likely that 
what we are seeing here is the effects of the recession that began in February 2001, as the 
“high wage” high-tech sectors were among the hardest hit by the recession.  The data also 
indicate this (see Table 3).  I have again examined the three counties with the lowest 
proportion “low paid”: Multnomah, Washington, and Clackamas counties.  Now, if we 
look at the average weekly employment in two high-tech industries, “Software 
publishers” (NAICS 5112) and “ISPs, search portals, and data processing” (NAICS 518), 
we can see the trend that I am addressing.  In almost every case there was dramatic 
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growth in these industries from 1996 to 2000, and then dramatic decline from 2000 to 
2002.  The only case that doesn’t follow suit is NAICS 518 in Clackamas County, and I 
believe that this is because the industry is so small (157 average weekly employment in 
1996, compare with 1,732 in Multnomah County) that only tiny, insignificant changes 
produced the observed fluctuations.   
 Note that the effects of the recession do not account for the relative declines in 
employment rates in “high wage” areas between 1996 and 2000 (as the recession began 
in 2001).  I suggest that perhaps features of the monopsony model are at work here.  It is 
plausible that, in the very small counties, employers behave more like a “mining 
company in an isolated company town” (i.e. the only purchaser of labor) than do 
employers in larger counties.  Also, recall the argument of Dolado et al. (1995), that “the 
important question is the extent of monopsony power.”  If employers in small counties 
have relatively more monopsony power, then theory predicts that the minimum wage 
increases (if skillfully set) may actually raise employment in those counties rather than 
reduce it.      
 Whether or not there truly is monopsony power among minimum wage employers, 
we still must ask: is there evidence that the minimum wage increases caused the 
employment of low wage workers to increase, given the results of equation (1) over the 
[Q4 96 - Q4 00] interval?  Taken alone, the hypothesis β  > 0 seems plausible.  However, 
given the results of equation (2), I am reluctant to adopt this view.  Alternatively, I am 
confident that, in this particular case, the minimum wage had no adverse effect on 
employment, as there is no evidence to support the hypothesis β  < 0.  This is the same 
conclusion that was reached by Stewart (2003), the model for this paper, and the 
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aforementioned body of research conducted by Card and Krueger (1992, 1994, 1995, 
2000). 
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IV. IS THEORY WRONG? 
Given that the results of this paper are in keeping with the “controversial” body of 
research on the employment effects of minimum wage legislation, I will review the 
validity of the standard economic model.  It is important to note that just because 
economists are frequently unable to measure negative employment effects does not mean 
that the standard economic model offers an invalid method of thinking about and 
examining minimum wage legislation.  The power of the standard model is in its 
simplicity and intuitiveness.  It should make sense to anyone that as the price of a 
commodity or production input increases, demand for it will decrease.  If the price of 
Coke rises, some Coke consumers will switch to Pepsi.  If the price of labor increases, 
producers will attempt to get more effort out of fewer workers, or they will switch to 
more capital-intensive modes of production (as capital has become relatively cheaper). 
 So if the theory is essentially correct, the problem must be with the capabilities of 
the measurement techniques currently employed by economists.  I agree with the position 
of Deere et al. (1995), who also find some “seemingly anomalous results”:  
 We do not view our…findings as refutation of the law of demand; instead we take them 
as a warning that minimum wages are not everything that affects employment and that 
other things must be considered before we can correctly assess the employment effects of 
minimum wages. 
 
Similarly, Singell and Terborg (2001) warn that data selection is crucial: 
“aggregation over different types of workers and firms may be inappropriate and can 
understate the employment effect of the minimum wage.”  
 The low values of R2  in all of the regression relationships presented in this study 
confirm this view (the values of R2 in the eight equations estimated ranged from 0.013 
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and 0.340).17  Had the data used for this study been at the individual level rather than at 
the industry level, the results may have confirmed economic theory (at the very least, 
they would have been more instructive).  Singell and Terborg (2001) analyze the 
employment effects of the same minimum wage increases in Oregon, in a specific 
industry (the restaurant industry), at the more disaggregated firm level, and find evidence 
in support of the standard economic model.  In the future, the method of this study could 
be made to produce more useful results if the data are gathered from unemployment 
insurance records, which offer an extremely large sample of detailed individual level data.  
Time constraints forbade the use of such data in this study. 
   Economists may also encounter problems in measuring the predicted negative 
employment effects because the economy is a hugely complex and vast system, and 
minimum wage laws may only create a small undetectable, or barely detectable, ripple.  
However, Card and Krueger (1995) note that even though their “empirical evidence 
suggests that the standard model is incomplete,” they also “suspect that, at sufficiently 
high levels of the minimum wage, the predicted employment losses of the standard model 
will be borne out.”  I am fairly certain that if the minimum wage in Oregon was raised to 
$20 or $30, there would be no problems in measuring the resultant negative employment 
effects, even at high aggregation levels.  At extremely high levels, say $75, not only 
would we see negative employment effects, we may find doctors driving taxicabs.   
                                                 
17 R2 is a measure of the predictive power of a model, a.k.a. a “goodness of fit” measure, defined by the 
percentage of the variation of the dependent variable that is explained by the regression; the higher R2, the 
closer the estimated regression equation fits the sample data; all values of R2 must lie between 0 and 1. 
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V. SUMMARY 
This paper evaluates the employment effects of the 1997-99 increases in the Oregon 
minimum wage.  The employment effects were estimated by exploiting geographic wage 
variation at the county and MSA levels.  Two similar equations were estimated: the first 
used the proportion “low paid” in a particular area to predict the change in employment 
rates in that area, and the second used the same predictor to estimate total employment 
changes.  Both equations were estimated over four different time intervals; three of the 
time intervals were across the “affected” years and one interval was used as a control.  
The prediction tested is that of the standard economic model: the proportion “low paid” 
should be inversely related to the changes in area level employment rates and total 
employment after the minimum wage increases (β < 0).  
 The results are mixed.  The results of the employment rate equations contradict 
the standard economic theory: the higher the proportion “low paid”, the more positive 
was the change in the employment rate (β > 0).  These results were also statistically 
significant.  On the other hand, the results of the total employment equations are 
consistent with theory: the higher the proportion “low paid”, the more negative was the 
change in total employment (β < 0).  However, the estimate of β over the “affected” 
interval was not significantly different from the estimate of β over the control interval, 
which indicates that the changes in area level total employment were not affected by the 
minimum wage legislation.  In summary, no evidence was found in support of the 
standard economic model.       
 24
REFERENCES 
Brown C. (1999). ‘Minimum wages, employment and the distribution of income’, in 
 Ashenfelter, O. and Card, D. (eds), Handbook of Labor Economics, Vol. 3, 
 Elsevier, Amsterdam. 
Burkhauser, R.V., Couch, K.A. and Wittenburg, D.C. (2000). ‘A reassessment of the new 
 economics of the minimum wage literature with monthly data from the current 
 population survey’, Journal of Labor Economics, Vol. 18, pp. 653-680.   
Card, D. (1992). ‘Using regional variation in wages to measure the effects of the federal 
 minimum wage’, Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 46, pp. 22-37. 
Card, D. and Krueger, A. B. (1994). ‘Minimum wages and employment: a case study of 
 the fast-food industry in New Jersey and Pennsylvania’, American Economic 
 Review, Vol. 84, pp. 772-793. 
-------- (1995). Myth and Measurement: The New Economics of the Minimum Wage, 
 Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ. 
-------- (2000). ‘Minimum wages and employment: a case study of the fast-food industry 
 in New Jersey and Pennsylvania: reply’, American Economic Review, Vol. 90, pp. 
 1397-1420. 
Deere, D., Murphy, K. and Welch, F. (1995). ‘Employment and the 1990-1991 minimum 
 wage hike’, American Economic Review, Vol. 85, pp. 232-237.   
Dolado, J., Kramarz, F., Machin, S., and Manning, A., Margolis, D. and Teulings, C. 
 (1995). ‘The economic impact of minimum wages in Europe’, Economic Policy, 
 Vol. 23, p. 330. 
 25
Katz, L. F. and Krueger, A.B. (1992). ‘The effect of the minimum wage on the fast-food 
 industry’, Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 46, pp. 6-21.   
Linneman, P. (1982). ‘The economic impacts of minimum wage laws: a new look at an 
 old question’ Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 90, pp. 443-469. 
Neumark, D. (2001). ‘The employment effects of minimum wages: evidence from a 
 prespecified research design’, Industrial Relations, Vol. 40, pp. 121-144. 
Neumark, D. and Wascher, W. (1992). ‘Minimum wages and employment: a case study 
 of the fast-food industry in New Jersey and Pennsylvania: comment’, American 
 Economic Review, Vol. 90, pp. 1362-1396. 
-------- (2000). ‘Employment effects of minimum and subminimum wages: panel data on 
 state minimum wage laws’, Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 46, pp. 
 55-81. 
Singell, L. D. and Terborg, J.R. (2001). ‘Production, Labor Utilization, and Employment 
 Effects of the Oregon Minimum Wage: A Survey and Natural Experiment in the 
 Restaurant Industry,’ University of Oregon Working Paper. 
Stewart, M.B. (2003). ‘Estimating the impact of the minimum wage using geographical 
 wage variation’, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 64, pp. 583-
 605. 
-------- (2004). ‘The employment effects of the national minimum wage, The Economic 
 Journal, Vol. 114, pp. C110-C116. 
 
 26
APPENDIX 
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Figure 2.4 
Control: 1992 - 1996 
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Figure 3.1 
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Figure 3.3 
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TABLE A1 
Population growth by county 
County  
Proportion 
"Low Paid"  
Q4 96 
1996 
Pop. 
2000 
Pop. 
∆ Pop. 
96-00 
2001 
Pop. 
2002 
Pop. 
∆ Pop. 
00-02 
Baker 20.00% 16652 16727 75 16654 16492 -235 
Benton 18.52% 77776 78159 383 78346 78874 715 
Clackamas 5.26% 322376 339576 17200 345276 352427 12851 
Clatsop 21.74% 35444 35592 148 35574 35645 53 
Columbia 19.35% 41454 43670 2216 44310 45449 1779 
Coos 20.00% 63505 62686 -819 62377 62618 -68 
Crook 30.00% 17227 19339 2112 19918 20172 833 
Curry 30.00% 21023 21117 94 21127 21480 363 
Deschutes 8.45% 99362 116594 17232 120750 125566 8972 
Douglas 19.70% 99802 100465 663 100307 101142 677 
Grant 17.65% 8079 7898 -181 7524 7437 -461 
Harney 36.36% 7201 7612 411 7418 7326 -286 
Hood River 24.24% 19339 20477 1138 20455 20645 168 
Jackson 12.99% 170715 181840 11125 183851 186650 4810 
Jefferson 16.67% 17307 19109 1802 19459 19592 483 
Josephine 19.23% 72310 75876 3566 76526 77820 1944 
Klamath 17.65% 62061 63927 1866 64212 64307 380 
Lake 25.00% 7476 7411 -65 7474 7421 10 
Lane 10.59% 311004 323413 12409 324674 327327 3914 
Lincoln 21.57% 44720 44337 -383 44057 44494 157 
Linn 13.85% 100582 103019 2437 103786 104898 1879 
Malheur 24.32% 30211 31538 1327 31453 31271 -267 
Marion 10.47% 266490 285581 19091 288690 293463 7882 
Morrow 14.29% 9336 11062 1726 11259 11605 543 
Multnomah 0.95% 639587 661392 21805 668969 675438 14046 
Polk 21.43% 57967 62649 4682 63715 64743 2094 
Sherman 28.57% 1933 1924 -9 1862 1788 -136 
Tillamook 23.33% 23994 24259 265 24447 24494 235 
Umatilla 16.67% 66240 70682 4442 70621 71413 731 
Union 31.43% 24934 24552 -382 24318 24435 -117 
Wallowa 17.65% 7507 7219 -288 7176 7081 -138 
Wasco 10.81% 23170 23822 652 23714 23579 -243 
Washington 7.69% 398289 448442 50153 462543 471962 23520 
Yamhill 13.56% 78538 85284 6746 86392 87913 2629 
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis 
